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COMMENTS
THE ILLINOIS GRAND JURY INDICTMENT:
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS?
The grand jury is a relic of another condition of society and of a
method of administeringjustice now entirely reformed.
London Times, July 11, 1849
INTRODUCTION

In the entire field of criminal law, no single institution or
practice has been so severely criticized as the grand jury. As a
procedure for initiating felony prosecutions, opponents of the
grand jury system have characterized it as a "puppet"' or "rubber stamp ' 2 of the prosecutor's office. They point to abuses of
the system as calling for its abolition. 3 Advocates for maintenance of the grand jury, as one manner of initiating felony prosecutions, base their argument upon the premise that the grand
jury is necessary to protect individuals from unfounded accusa4
tions of criminal conduct.
1. W. Coates, Grand Jury, The Prosecutor'sPuppet. Wasteful Nonsense
of Criminal Jurisprudence,33 PENN. BA Q 311 (1962).
2. Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 423, 429-31. [hereinafter cited as Calkins].
3. M.P. Antell, Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Super-Government, 51
A.B.A. J 153 F (1965); Calkins, supra note 2; T.M. Kranitz, Grand Jury; PastPresent-No Future, 24 Mo. L. REV. 318 (1959); J.P. Vukasin Jr., Grand Jury:
Useful or Useless?, 34 CALIF. SBJ 436 (1959); L.P. Watts Jr., Grand Jury:
Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique? 37 NCL REV. 290 (1959).
4. Brown, Ten Reasons Why the Grand Jury in New York Should be
Retained and Strengthened, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 471, 473 (1967). But a
reading of history indicates that protection of individual rights was not a
contemporaneous motivation for creating the grand jury. The grand jury
was born in England with the issuance of the Assize of Clarendon by Henry
II in 1166 which was reissued in 1176 in the Assize of Northampton. W.
Holdsworth, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-23 (3rd ed. 1922). Nothing in
the history of the Assize of Clarendon supports the proposition that the
grand jury developed for the protection of an innocent accused. Barons
seeking relief from royal officials such as sheriffs, constables, and coroners
found it in chapter 24 of Magna Carta which provided that "[njo sheriff,
constable, coroners or other of Our Baliffs shall hold pleas of Our Crown."
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMENTARY 43 (1964).
Somewhere between its inception and subsequent incorporation into
the fifth amendment to our Federal Constitution, philosophical justification
for the grand jury shifted. The United States has historically regarded the
grand jury as a watchdog for individual rights. In Illinois as early as 1870,
this common misconception had become the foundation for proponents of
retaining a state grand jury system. One delegate to the constitutional convention of that year remarked:
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The heated debate, over whether or not to retain the grand
jury appears to have been rendered academic in Illinois. Despite persuasive commentary and express constitutional authority to abolish the grand jury, 5 both existing for well over one
hundred years, 6 the indictment process remains substantially
[T]hrough long centuries this very grand jury system standing between
the people and the crown, between the freemen and the star chamber,
by its continuous influence, contributed as much to settle the foundation of human freedom in the minds and sentiments and opinions of the
English people as any other institution known to that island.
2

DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ILLINOIS 1869-1870, at 1437 (1870). For a history of the grand jury in Illinois, see

Calkins, supra note 2.
5. The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides in relevant part:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense unless on
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is
by fine or by imprisonment other than in the penitentiary, in cases of
impeachment, and in cases arising in the militia when in actual service
in time of war or public danger. The General Assembly by law may
abolish the grandjury or further limit its use. (emphasis added).
ILL. CONST. art. I. § 7, cl. 1.
6. The 1970 Constitution is certainly not innovative. Consider the corresponding provision in the 1870 document:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is
by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of
impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger; Provided that the
grandjury may be abolished by law in all cases. (emphasis added).
ILL. CONsT. art. II § 8, cl. 1. (1870). The minor change in language is said to
have been aimed at clarifying the legislature's authority with respect to the
grand jury. Under the 1870 provision, it was unclear as to whether use of
the grand jury could be limited, without a total abolition "in all cases."
Even at the 1870 convention there was strong opposition to the grand
jury. A proposed amendment seeking to abolish the indictment process
sparked a vitriolic debate. The delegate offering the amendment stated by
way of introduction:
I am satisfied that this grand jury system has ceased to be any protection to the interests or the rights of the people in any of the forms,
involving life, liberty, or property or character. It is an abuse in its operation on almost every one of these rights and privileges.
2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ILLINOIS at 1434 (1870). In support of the amendment another delegate said:
I regard this grand jury system as the one dark spot upon our glorious
judicial system; as a relic of the star chamber; as a well-defined adjunct
of the old inquisitional order that prevailed for so great a length of time
in the old world. In my opinion no public good is subserved by retaining it. The object of criminal law is to punish the guilty, to give all persons charged a fair opportunity of appearing, confronting their
witnesses, of having their charges investigated, and passed upon by a
jury of their country.
The grand jury system pre-judges the indicted party's case. It is
regarded by many persons, and always so insisted upon by State's Attorneys as prima facie evidence of guilt, that a grand jury have returned
an indictment against an individual.
Id. at 1436.
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unmolested by statute 7 or judicial review. 8 It has become part of
the genetic fiber in Illinois' judicial system. Thus, to render any
further commentary useful, the existence of a grand jury must
be taken as a given. From that base, by purposefully probing
the gamut of pretrial activity in Illinois, the grand jury indictment may be viewed in a more meaningful perspective.
Whenever a topic of discussion commands great debate, arguments tend to proceed from foregone conclusions. In this
case, logical inquiry is necessary to evaluate the aphorism that
the grand jury is an evil, a reprobate body whose very existence
is counter-productive. Therefore, this comment is neither a demand for abolition nor an idealistic plea for reform. Rather, the
attempt here is to analyze the grand jury indictment in terms of
its relationship with the preliminary hearing, 9 then compare the
results of that analysis to an actual case, 10 while at all times
7. Notwithstanding its authority, the legislature has done very little to
control the grand jury outside of enacting innocuous rules proscribing the
method of selecting members and assembling the body. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 112-1 thru § 112-6 (1977). Only one provision of the Illinois statutes affects the jury's operation. Section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
lists 10 specific grounds upon which a defendant may base a motion to dismiss a criminal charge. As far as they relate to grand jury indictments, the
grounds are procedurally oriented and do not speak to protection of any
inherent rights of an accused. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-1 (1977). See also
text accompanying note 80 infra.
8. The activities of the grand jury have never been flatly at issue, but
Illinois courts have had opportunities to initiate reform. However, when the
initiative was taken by trial judges, reviewing courts were unreceptive and
reversed in no uncertain terms:
We agree with the State's contention that the trial court did not
have authority to enter the order of dismissal for want of prosecution.
The court on its own motion, or on the motion of defendant has no
power before trial, in the absence of statute, to dismiss criminal charges
or enter a nolle prosequi in a criminal case, since this power rests intially and primarily with the prosecution officer ... The court may dismiss an indictment, information or complaint only upon the grounds set
forth in section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
People v. Guido, 11 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1069, 297 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1973). For a good
discussion of the grand jury's history in Illinois see People v. Graydon, 333
Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1928).
9. A preliminary hearing is simply a hearing, conducted by a magistrate or judge, which is given to a person accused of a crime to ascertain
whether there is evidence to warrant or require the commitment and holding to bail of the person accused. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 852 (4th ed.
1968). State v. Clark, 546 S.W.2d 455, 462 (Mo. 1977) (a preliminary hearing
is simply a means to prevent abuse of power by the prosecution and to permit detention by means of a limited inquiry into whether there is probable
cause that the accused committed an offense); Lambus v. Kaiser, 352 Mo.
Rep. 122, 125, 176 S.W.2d 494, 497 (1943) (a preliminary hearing is in no sense
a trial, but is simply a course of procedure to prevent prosecutorial abuse of
power); State v. Langford, 293 Mo. Rep. 436, 443, 240 S.W. 167, 168 (1922) (a
preliminary hearing is a course of procedure designed to prevent an abuse
of power). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 102-17 (1977).
10. People v. Creque 72 Ill. 2d 515, 382 N.E.2d 793 (1978).
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keeping a watchful eye on that transcendental notion known as
due process.'
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE

Grand Jury Indictment
It is something of an anomaly when legal commentators describe an accused felon as possessing the "right" to go before a
grand jury, since most agree that the "right" is really an onus on
the defendant.' 2 Yet the idea sought to be conveyed is essentially correct: one accused of a crime has an absolute right to a
3
determination that probable cause exists to hold him for trial.'
This idea permeates all facets of criminal law. For instance, police officers are well aware that they must have "probable cause"
to stop a pedestrian and search his person, 14 to go beyond the
11. Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise
of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights
as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 590 (4th ed. 1968).

12. Though appearance before a grand jury is often sub-titled a "right,"
the common conclusion of legal writers is that the grand jury should be
abandoned or modified. These conclusions, drawn from critical treatment
of the indictment process, are at least tacit admissions that the "right" is
burdensome if not manifestly onerous. Robinson, The Determination of
ProbableCause in Illinois - Grand Jury or PreliminaryHearing, 7 Loy. L.J.
931 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]; Canfield, Have We Outgrown The
Grand Jury?, ILL. B.J. 206 (Jan. 1952); Calkins, supra note 2; Comment,
Should The Grand Jury Indictment ProcedureBe Abolished In Illinois?, 2 J.
MAR. J. 348 (1969). In addition, when the accused is allowed to testify as a
witness before the grand jury, his failure to answer incriminating questions
exposes him to a public hearing in court. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); United States v. Levine, 267 F.2d 335 (2nd Cir. 1959); In re Wille, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e)
(C.C.D. Va. 1807).
13. The notion that probable cause must exist before an accused can be
held to answer for an offense stems from the idea that an individual has a
right to be secure in his person. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. It follows
that a person has a right to be free from prosecution absent a showing sufficient to warrant suspension of that right. Roads v. Superior Court, in and
for County of Siskiyou, 275 Cal. App. 2d 593, 80 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1969); People
v. Garcia, 265 Cal. App. 2d 94, 71 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1968); Jensen v. Superior
Court, in and for Los Angeles County, 96 Cal. App. 2d 112, 214 P.2d 828
(1950). Further, unless there is a good faith belief on the part of the person
bringing the charge that the defendant has committed a crime, an action for
malicious prosecution will lie in favor of the innocent accused. Redding v.
Medica, 411 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum Co., 400 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1975).
14. When a search is involved, the issue of probable cause becomes a
fourth amendment problem. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The search or seizure
is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional if conducted without "sufficient probability" of obtaining incriminating evidence. Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A "seizure" occurs whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
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scope of a limited investigation, 15 or to make an arrest without a
16
warrant.
A grand jury indictment is essentially a statement by the
jury that they believe there is reason, sufficient at law, to compel
the accused to stand trial for the offense charged.17 They form
their belief after hearing evidence proffered by the prosecutor.
However, in Illinois and in most jurisdictions, the "evidence"
which a jury may consider to return an indictment is often less
than that required to obtain a conviction at trial and frequently
violates traditional rules of evidence. 18 For example, an out of
court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein will be excluded as hearsay in every American court. 19
away. Yam Sang Kwai v. Immagration &Naturalization Service 411 F.2d 683
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969). In addition, the obtaining

of physical evidence from a person involves potential fourth amendment

violations at two levels: the seizure of the person necessary to bring him in
contact with government agents and the subsequent search for evidence.
United States v. Lincoln, 494 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1974).
15. Cause to search one place is not necessarily cause to search another. McCann v. State, 504 P.2d 432 (Okl. 1972). General exploratory
searches are not tolerated and the searcher must have in mind some reasonably specific thing he is looking for and reasonable grounds to believe it
is in the place being searched. State v. Call, 8 Ohio App. 2d 277, 220 N.E. 2d
130 (1965). Even when a search warrant is issued, the fourth amendment
requires that objects to be seized be specifically described. United States v.
Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1976).
16. Though sometimes labeled a "reasonableness" standard, some finding of cause sufficient to justify detention amounting to arrest is always required. United States v. Bates 533 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Martin, 509 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967 (1975); United
States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Salvo, 447 F.2d
474 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Kirkland v. Preston, 385
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
17. When the grand jury considers returning an indictment, their duty
is twofold. They must first determine whether there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed, and second that a particular suspect
has committed that crime. Only when both of these requirements have
been met may they return an indictment or "true bill." Bacon v. United
States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1972); Arrington v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 710, affd 475 F.2d
1394 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Atlantic Commission Co., 45 F. Supp.
187 (E.D.N.C. 1942); State v. Atkins, 26 Conn. Supp. 209, 216 A.2d 840 (1966);
United States v. Atlantic Commission Co., 45 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.C. 1942).
18. As a general proposition, a grand jury is to conduct its investigation
in accord with standard rules of evidence. Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41 (1972); Gordon v. Tracy, 238 S.W. 395 (Ky. 1922). But the rule is not
at all enforced. The grand jury may compel production of evidence and is
not bound by evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Maddox v. State, 213 Ind. 537,
12 N.E. 2d 947 (1938). The grand jury is also free to consider evidence illeally seized. United States v. Pike, 523 F.2d 734, rehearing denied 525 F.2d
07(D.C. Cir. 1975). See also, Criminalprocedure - grand juries - exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases does not apply to grand jury
proceedings, 27 VAND. L. REv. 560-72 (1974).
19. At common law the notion evolved that statements made out of
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Nonetheless, indictments based solely on hearsay testimony are
sufficient to bring the accused20 to trial, and convictions based on
them will not be overturned.
In addition, grand jury proceedings have been classified as
non-adversary, non-judicial affairs 21 at which a defendant has no
meaningful right to counsel, 22 no right to cross examine wit24
nesses, 23 and no opportunity to present evidence of his own.
The justification offered for the denial of these procedural safeguards is that the accused has not been harmed because he will
have all these rights at trial. The argument is that, if the defendant can then prove his innocence, no lasting detriment has befallen him.25 This approach overlooks the fact that going to trial
court, not subject to the truth seeking devices of oath and cross-examination, were not admissible as evidence. The motivation was to bring witnesses before the court so that under oath, subject to all the truth seeking
devices, the truth could be more readily determined. WIGMORE ON EviDENCE § 1364 (1974). Although the hearsay rule remains an operative concept in our system of jurisprudence, common law and statutory exceptions
seem to have undermined its basic philosophy. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 1420-26 (1974); F.R. EVID. § 803-04.
20. It is black letter law in most jurisdictions that hearsay evidence is
admissible before a grand jury. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2nd
Cir. 1955); State v. Parks, 437 P.2d 642 (Alaska, 1968); State v. Chandler, 98
N.J. Super 241, 236 A.2d 632 (1967). Criminalprocedure- grandjury - validity of indictment based solely on hearsay questioned when direct testimony
is readily available, 43 NYU L. REV. 578 (May 1968); Criminallaw - sufficiency of indictment based solely on hearsay, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (Autumn 1955). Further, that indictments based on hearsay are not subject to
attack as grounds for reversing a conviction is a general averment subsumed by the reluctance to dismiss indictments for all but the most grievous of errors. In Illinois, an indictment is not subject to attack unless all the
witnesses and testimony were "incompetent." People v. Duncan, 261 Ill.
339, 103 N.E. 1043 (1914); People v. Moore, 28 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 329 N.E.2d 873
(1975).
21. When brought into issue, courts have labeled the grand jury an inquisitional and accusing body whose function is to determine probable
cause. In re Weir, 377 F. Supp. 919, aff'd 495 F.2d 879, cert. denied, Weir v.
United States, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); State v. Williams, 310 So. 2d 528 (La.
1975); Watson v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 2 Md. App. 134, 233 A.2d 321
(1967); Mathews v. Pound, 403 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1966).
22. The accused has no right to be heard either personally or through
counsel when his "case" is before the grand jury. United States v. Central

Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940); State v. Meek, 450 P.2d 115,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969); People v. Dupree, 186 C.A.2d 12, 319 P.2d 39
(1957); People v. Vlcek, 68 Ill. App. 2d 178, 215 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
23. Id. See also note 24 infra.
24. Even when the accused is brought before the grand jury, he is not
allowed to actively participate by presenting his own evidence. United
States v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Bolles, 209
F. 682 (W.D. Mo. 1913); People v. Fernandez, 172 C.A.2d 747, 342 P.2d 309
(1959); State v. Cox, 218 La. 277, 49 So. 2d 12 (1950).
25. The standard reply to assertions that an indictment is in some way
deficient is that so long as it is fair on its face, a defendant is required to
stand trial for the offense. The logic is that by strict observance of the rules
at a fair trial, any improprieties in the indictment will be cured. United
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is expensive, time consuming, and not particularly prestigious.
Further, the grand jury indictment itself casts a shadow upon an
individual which looms over him in proportion to the infamous
nature of the offense charged. 26 An individual implicated by indictment has, if nothing else, a substantial pragmatic interest in
curtailing the criminal process at the earliest opportunity.
These practices have been promulgated and ratified by the
courts in case after case.27 The judiciary has been indoctrinated
with them, and defense counsel must accept the grand jury's
methods as operative facts. However, over 400 years ago another vehicle for determining probable cause developed into a
viable alternative.
History of the PreliminaryHearing
Originally inquisitional in nature, the preliminary hearing
eventually evolved into a judicial proceeding. 28 Although technically having no roots in the common law, two statutes in England provided for preliminary hearings as early as the sixteenth
century. 29 These statutes empowered justices of the peace to
examine accused felons and hear testimony from witnesses to
determine whether there was reason to believe the accused had
committed a crime. 3° Upon affirmative resolution, the suspect
would be confined in jail or released on bond pending trial. If
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); People v. Jones, 19 Ill.
2d 37, 166 N.E.2d 1 (1960).

26. The Illinois Supreme Court was at least receptive to the idea that
the indictment itself has adverse implications. A suspect, by being indicted,
carries a cloak of guilt that is not completely removed, even by acquittal.
People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971). See also, In re Fried, 161

F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
27. See notes 20-25 supra.
28. See Woods v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942); L.
Orfield, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 53-61 (1947). It is
generally accepted that the preliminary hearing is a judicial proceeding.
People v. Johnson, 8 Mich. App. 462, 154 N.W.2d 671 (1967); Durmer v.
Huegin, 110 Wis. 109, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901); 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law§ 443
(1965). One court has gone so far as to call a preliminary hearing a trial.
Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So. 2d 494, 500 (Fla. 1954).
29. As an inquisitional device, the early form of preliminary hearing was
born of two statutes. 1 & 2 Phil. & M.C. 13 (1554-1555); 2 & 3 Phil. & M.C. 10
(1555). For an analysis of these two statutes see J. Langbein, PROSECUTING
CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE, ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, p. 5-125 (1974).
30. The function of the preliminary hearing remains virtually unchanged. While procedures differ from one jurisdiction to another, the primary function of the preliminary hearing remains to determine probable
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 115 (1975); United States v. Allen, 409
F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1969); People v. Ferro, 353 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1974); People v.
Maire, 42 Mich. App. 32, 201 N.W.2d 318 (1972); State v. Ussery, 452 S.W.2d
146 (Mo. 1970); State v. Reggio, 176 N.W.2d 62 (S.D. 1970).
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accusation, the defendant
the evidence did not sustain the
31
custody.
from
released
be
would
The framers of the United States Constitution, in selecting
what of the English common law to adopt, did not provide for a
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause. 32 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has adhered to the proposition that in federal court, a judicial determination of probable cause is not a
prerequisite to prosecution. 33 Similarly, in Lem Woon v.
Oregon,34 the Court held the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require the states to provide for a
preliminary hearing prior to initiating a prosecution by information. 35 Though used extensively to resolve collateral issues
before, during, and after trial in civil cases, the preliminary hearing has not attained notoriety as an arbiter of probable cause in
criminal prosecutions.

36

Prior to July 1, 1971, preliminary hearings in Illinois were a
31. It follows that if an accusation is groundless, the suspect cannot be
held in custody. This proposition remained constant throughout the history
of the preliminary hearing. See Krutz v. Moffit, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); 2 M.
Hale, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 77, 81, 95, 121, (1736); I. J. Stephen, HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 233 (1883). Under the English law examination of the prisoner was inquisitional and the witnesses were questioned
outside the prisoner's presence. It became well established that the prisoner was entitled to an absolute discharge if the investigation turned up
insufficient evidence of his guilt. Id., at 233.
32. The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, passed
by the First Continental Congress in 1791, secure to citizens of the United
States certain "fundamental" rights. Among them is the right to be free
from prosecution for an infamous crime unless on indictment by a grand
jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This is however, the only provision in the entire document or its amendments that specifies the prerequisites for a felony prosecution.
33. Federal courts have been unwilling to read into the fifth amendment
any requirement of a preliminary hearing. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
34. 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
35. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913). For an updated version see Carter v. Kilbane, 519 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally
Robinson, The determinationof Probable Cause in Illinois - Grand Jury or
PreliminaryHearing, 7 Loy. L.J. 931. [hereinafter cited as Robinson].
36. In civil litigation, judicial hearings play an important role in managing the lawsuit and guiding its course. They are particularly useful at the
close of discovery in Federal Court to elicit evidence and limit issues for
trial. F.R. Crv. P. Rule 16.
However, as a device for establishing probable cause in criminal cases,
the preliminary hearing often takes a back seat to the grand jury indictment. United States v. Daras, 462 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1046 (1972); United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409U.S. 888 (1972); United States v. Le Pera, 443 F.2d 810 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1046 (1972); United States v. Foster, 440 F.2d 390
(7th Cir. 1971); Bonner v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 915 (1970).
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matter of legislative grace.37 There was no recognized right to a
judicial determination of probable cause. 38 However, at the 1970
Illinois Constitutional Convention, the seeds were sown which
eventually raised the preliminary hearing to constitutional status.3 9 The minutes of the convention reveal that the preliminary
hearing section of the constitution was a direct result of the Bill
of Rights Committee's cognizance of the grand jury's shortcom40
ings.
Although acutely aware of its criticisms, the Bill of Rights
Committee again voted to retain the grand jury indictment as
one method of initiating felony prosecutions. The committee
felt that the investigatory powers of the grand jury contributed a
meaningful service to the community, but noted its indictment
process to be of marginal utility. 4 1 Consequently, in an effort to
placate and compromise the issue, a preliminary hearing section
was proposed. Designed to cure the vices while retaining the
virtues of the grand jury,4 2 this section provides, as of right, for
an alternative method of initiating criminal prosecutions. However, it may be more accurate to characterize one's right to a
judicial determination of probable cause in Illinois as illusory.
WORKING RELATIONSHIPS-STATE OF THE ART

Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2 of the Illinois Constitution provides: "No
person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death
or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either the initial
charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury or the
37. The 1965 edition of the Illinois revised statutes provided for a limited
use of the preliminary hearing. A person arrested, with or without a warrant, was to be brought before a judge and given a preliminary hearing to
establish probable cause only if the judge was without jurisdiction to hear
the case. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1, 3 (1965).

38. The limited statutory provisions for a preliminary hearing did not
spark adoption of the procedure as a matter of "right." Robinson, supra
note 35, at 937. See also People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527
(1967); People v. Petruso, 35 Ill. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
39. When the 1970 Illinois Constitution was ratified, the preliminary
hearing was elevated to a constitutionally guaranteed right, presumably on
a par with the grand jury indictment. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
40. 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF ILLINOIS 1970, at 1454 (1970). [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. Committee members considering abolishing the grand jury indictment were influenced by the fact that an indictment often represents no more than the
whim of the prosecutor. Since the grand jury hears one side of the evidence, an indictment is automatic. See generally Stern, Seeking a Rational
Determinationof Probable Cause, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 559 (1975). [hereinafter cited as Stern].

41. 6 PROCEEDINGS supra note 40, at 1439.
42. The biggest objection to the grand jury procedure was the returning
of an indictment solely on State's evidence. Stern, supra note 40, at 560-62.
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person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause. '43 A fair reading of this provision indicates
that there are two ways in which one could be held to answer for
a felony in Illinois. First, if the grand jury, by utilizing its investigatory powers, initiates the prosecution by indictment. Or, in
the alternative, if after arrest the accused is given a prompt preliminary hearing to determine probable cause. The disjunctive
wording of the section lends itself to one and only one reasonable interpretation, that the two procedures were intended to be
mutually exclusive. Indeed, such an interpretation has been
ascribed to this section by many commentators.4
The pivotal language in the section is the reference to the
"initial charge." The framers intended that where the initial
charge results from an arrest, the accused has a right to be formally charged by a judge sitting at a prompt preliminary hearing.45 On the other hand, where the charge results from a grand
43. ILL. CONST. art. I §7 cl. 2 (emphasis added).

44. Herman and Whalen, Constitutional Commentary, S.H.A. Const. of
1970. In reference to art. I § 7 the work states:
[I]n cases where the prosecutor obtains a grand jury indictment prior
to the defendant being taken into custody, there is no Constitutional
requirement for a preliminary hearing because the issue of probable
cause will have been determined by the grand jury in deciding to indict.
These cases are probably the exception. Usually the "initial charge" is
made by an arresting officer rather than a grand jury. In such cases the
person would be entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing unless it was
understandingly waived.
Id. at 372. See also Stern, supra note 40, at 574-75.
45. The argument against holding an accused without a formal charge
following a determination of probable cause is that such detention may violate his fourth and fourteenth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. This logically flows from the well established
principle that an "arrest" with or without a warrant is legal only if probable
cause to make the arrest exists. United States v. Radford, 452 F.2d 332 (7th
Cir. 1971); D'Agostino v. State, 310 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1975); Kansas City v.
Fulton, 533 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1976); Lurie v. Kings County, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256, 56
Misc. 2d 68 (1968). Courts are careful to distinguish between an arrest and a
temporary detention which may be made without a showing of probable
cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In California, to justify a temporary
detention, the officer involved must be able to point to specific facts which,
along with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the action. Anderson v.
Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 88 Cal. Rptr. 617 9 Cal. App. 3d
851 (1970). But despite this careful articulation, once an arrest is made,
wholly on the presumption that it was made with probable cause, Illinois
courts have tolerated long delays between arrest and indictment. People v.
Hansaker, 23 Ill. App. 3d 55, 318 N.E.2d 737 (1974) (delay of 48 days); People
v. Williams, 19 Ill. App. 3d 136, 310 N.E.2d 666 (1974) (delay of 17 days); People v. Savage, 12 Ill. App. 3d 734, 298 N.E.2d 758 (1973) (delay of 22 days).
The fact that an indictment is ultimately returned has a settling effect, but
what would happen if after 48 days of confinement the grand jury found no
probable cause to indict? Illinois courts have never faced this problem because the indictment is inevitable. Stern, supra note 40; W. Coates, Grand
Jury the Prosecutor'sPuppet. Wasteful nonsense of criminaljurisprudence,
33 PENN. BAQ 311 (1962); Calkins, supra note 2. In 1973 Cook County grand
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jury investigation, the determination of probable cause must antedate any arrest by first securing an indictment.46 Here, the initial charge of arrest reflects the formal charge of the indictment.
In this way the delegates sought to protect accused felons from a
denial of due process through confinement without a formal
charge. Since there is no right to trial until a formal charge has
been filed, 47 without a preliminary hearing, an innocent bytime in
stander mistakenly arrested could spend considerable
48
jail if there were no grand jury sitting to indict him.
At the convention, Delegate William Jaskula proposed a
change in the wording of section 7 that would have substituted
"unless a true bill has been voted by the grand jury" for "unless
juries returned a verdict of no indictment in less than four percent of their
cases. Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1974, at 7, col. 3. Even more startling is the
fact that the Fifth Appellate District in Illinois has recognized a violation of
at least the state constitution: "There is no question that a delay of four
months from the defendant's arrest to his trial without a preliminary hearing, even though there was a grand jury indictment in the interim violated a
constitutionally given right." People v. Sanders, 36 Ill. App. 3d 518, 344
N.E.2d 479 (1976). However, the court felt that the Illinois Supreme Court
decisions foreclosed reversal as a remedy. Id. at 520-21, 344 N.E.2d at 481.
See also People v. Todd, 34 Ill. App. 3d 844, 340 N.E.2d 669 (1976). But see
App. 3d 746, 377 N.E.2d 540 (1978) (delay of 176 days
People v. Kirkley, 60 Ill.
between arrest and subsequent indictment violated defendants' constitutional rights and required reversal of their convictions).
46. The two systems were designed to complement each other. If the
indictment preceded arrest, the determination of probable cause was subject to review at a preliminary hearing. If arrest preceded indictment, the
preliminary hearing was available to determine probable cause. 6
PROCEEDINGS supra note 40, at 76. But a finding of no probable cause did
not prevent the prosecutor from seeking an indictment if new or additional
evidence was produced. See 3 PROCEEDINGS supra note 40, at 1455. When a
judge, following arrest, enters a finding of probable cause thereby establishing the "lawfulness" of the detention, it would seem the grand jury is bound
to return an indictment. An Illinois statute required all felony prosecutions
to be by indictment of a grand jury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1971).
Therefore, unless the jury was bound to indict, the accused would be legally
held in custody with no access to a trial. Presumably his confinement
would be indefinite. People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d 165, 169, 295 N.E.2d 724, 726
(1973). Note, however, that Illinois law also provides a right for every person in "custody" to have a speedy trial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (1977).
47. According to Illinois statute, all felony prcsecutions must be initiated by indictment or information. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1977).
Courts have held this means there is no right to a trial in Illinois unless the
2d 165, 295 N.E.2d
statutory requirement is met. People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill.
724 (1973); People v. Moore, 28 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 329 N.E.2d 893 (1975). Other
jurisdictions are in accord. State v. Granberry, 530 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1975);
Box v. State, 241 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1970); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 235 Pa. 352,
340 A.2d 559 (1975); Simpson v. Cahn, 307 N.Y.S.2d 581, 33 A.D. 790 (1969).
48. The problem of an accused sitting in jail without a formal charge and
no right to trial becomes acute in rural areas where grand juries sit at sporadic intervals. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-3 (1977). Under Illinois law, it is
conceivable that in a county whose population is less than one million, a
grand jury may never be called since the power to convene the body lies
only with the judge or state's attorney. Id.
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'49
either the initial charge has been brought by. .. a grand jury.
Opposing this proposed change, Delegate Bernard Weisberg observed: "That would mean that a preliminary hearing right could
be easily defeated whenever a prosecutor chose to do so by simply postponing a preliminary hearing until he obtains a grand
jury indictment."5 0 Delegate Weisberg was concerned that deleting reference to the "initial charge" would frustrate the attempt to provide for a preliminary hearing as a matter of right.
The other delegates agreed, and Delegate Jaskula's proposed
change was defeated.

These records vividly display the delegates' concern for insuring the integrity of the preliminary hearing. However, Illinois courts have chosen to ignore the commentators and the
convention debates. In People v. Hendrix,51 the original charge
was brought by complaint, 52 and notwithstanding his arrest, the
defendant was subsequently indicted without being afforded a
preliminary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court, relying on a
statutory provision requiring felony prosecutions to be by indictment, 53 found defendant's assertion of a constitutional right
to a preliminary hearing "preposterous." Justice Goldenhersh
stated in his concurring opinion that the purpose of Art. I, sec. 7,
is fulfilled so long as probable cause is determined promptly either by grand jury indictment or appearance before a judge sit54
ting at a preliminary hearing.
Before paragraph two of Art. I, sec, 7, became part of the
constitution, Illinois law was well settled on the proposition that
a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing was not
binding on the grand jury.55 Since the preliminary hearing was
a matter of legislative grace, its determination of probable cause
was not considered conclusive. Thus, although a judicial officer
at an adversary proceeding 6 had found that there was no reason
49. 3 PROCEEDINGS supra note 40, at 1469.
50. Id.
51. 54 Ill.
2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (i973).
52. A complaint is a charge, made under oath, of the commission of a
crime or offense. 21 AM. JUR. 2d CriminalLaw § 441; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
102-9 (1977). In Illinois, only those crimes which are not deemed to be felonies may be prosecuted by a complaint. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1977).
53. People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d 165, 168, 295 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1973).
54. Id. at 170, 295 N.E.2d at 727.
55. The fact that a judge sitting at a preliminary hearing did not find
probable cause did not prevent the prosecutor from securing an indictment.
Bonner v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 7th Cir. 1970 cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1970);
People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967); People v. Morris, 30 Ill.
2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); People v. Jones, 9 Ill. 2d 481, 138 N.E.2d 522
(1957); People v. Rinks, 80 Ill.
App. 2d 152, 224 N.E.2d 29 (1967); People v.
Campbell, 49 Ill. App. 2d 269, 200 N.E.2d 72 (1964).
56. This result is disturbing since a preliminary hearing more closely
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sufficient at law to believe the accused had committed a crime,
the prosecutor was free to take his carefully selected evidence to
the grand jury and procure an indictment.5 7 However, by raising
the preliminary hearing to constitutional status, the convention
delegates seriously questioned a sizeable body of law.
As a result, the issue of "conclusiveness" was meaningfully
presented in People v. Kent.58 In Kent a grand jury returned an
indictment against the defendant, predicated upon the same evidence with which a judge had previously entered a finding of no
probable cause. At trial, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was granted on the premise that a judicial determination of no probable cause was constitutionally binding on the
grand jury. In reversing the trial court's dismissal, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2, of the constitution
was "not intended to attach finality" to a judicial determination
of probable cause.5 9 This decision, a logically predictable companion to Hendrix, certified the awesome autonomy of the
grand jury. Consequently, a prosecutor is still free to appear
before a judge at a preliminary hearing, and suffering an adverse
result, usher the accused over to the grand jury for indictment.
The People of the State of Illinois v. Franklin Creque
The defendant, Franklin Creque, was arrested and charged
with the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated battery
against Martha Creque, his estranged wife. A preliminary hearing was held at which direct evidence, including live testimony
from defense witnesses, was presented to the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Maurice Pompey entered a finding
of no probable cause as to the charge of attempted murder and
probable cause as to the offense of aggravated battery.
Within two weeks thereafter, the Assistant State's Attorney
who represented the People at the preliminary hearing appeared before the grand jury and secured an indictment alleging
that Franklin Creque committed both the offense of attempted
murder and of aggravated battery. There is no question but that
the evidence submitted to the grand jury was hearsay. Moreover, the Assistant State's Attorney did not advise the grand
jury that the testimony they heard was hearsay and therefore
inadmissable at trial, nor did he advise them of the existence of
direct evidence, or articulate their ability to secure such eviresembles a trial than does the ex parte grand jury indictment. 6 PROCEEDsupra note 40, at 76.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. 54 Ill. 2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1972).
59. Id. at 164, N.E.2d at 712.
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dence by subpoena. Furthermore, no explanation was offered
by the Assistant State's Attorney to apprise the grand jury of
the need for presentation of hearsay rather than direct evidence.
Finally, he did not inform the grand jury of the fact, and consequently deprived them of an opportunity to consider, that a
judge had entered a finding of no probable cause as to the
charge of attempted murder.
Although state circuit court judges rarely deliver written
opinions, Judge Strayhorn felt compelled to do so in Creque.
Granting defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, Judge
Strayhorn narrowly stated the issue before the court as encompassing all the factual elements set out above. So construed, the
court found the cumulative effect of those facts to warrant the
following order: "[T] o protect the integrity of the judicial process and upon the basis of fundamental fairness and due process
the motion of the defendant to dismiss the indictment should be
and is hereby sustained and the indictment is hereby dismissed. '60 A case of first impression owing to Judge Strayhorn's
wording of the order, the State's appeal was taken directly to the
61
Illinois Supreme Court.
•By specifically basing his decision on principles of fundamental fairness and due process, Judge Strayhorn squarely
presented only three issues for the supreme court to resolve:
(1) do Illinois courts command the inherent power to supervise grand juries and dismiss their indictments when they fail to
conduct themselves within due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions;
(2) to what standard of procedural and substantive due process will the grand jury be held. Or conversely stated, to what
extent will an accused be afforded due process safeguards
before a grand jury, and;
(3) do the facts of this case violate that standard?
60. People v. Creque, No. 77-1973, slip op. at 6 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 29, 1977).

There could be no doubt that the trial court's opinion in Creque was going
to address a due process issue:
The issue presented is: Does this court have the authority to dismiss an
indictment based solely on hearsay testimony wherein the prosecution
does not offer any reasons for not presenting direct testimony nor the
necessity for it to present only hearsay evidence and where the grand
jury is not advised of the existence of direct evidence nor its power to
secure the presence of eye-witnesses before it, thru the use of the grand
jury subpoena, nor is the grand jury advised that a judge, after a preliminary hearing in which direct evidence was presented found no probable cause?
Id. at 2.
61. Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was made possible by a

rule providing for such appeal when the public interest requires an expeditious determination of the case. ILL. SuP. CT. RULE 302 (b).
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POWER TO REVIEW GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

On the federal level, whether grand jury proceedings are
subject to judicial review would appear to be a fundamental
62
question answered in the affirmative by Marbury v. Madison
63
and its progeny.
The Supreme Court has consistently held
that it possesses inherent power to review actions taken by both
the executive and legislative branches. 64 That this power exists
has become so widely accepted it ceases to be an issue in most
cases brought before the court. 65 Thus, it necessarily follows
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This citation, committed to memory by
countless students of Constitutional law, is relied on for its dicta, not its
holding. The great Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held quite simply that
the Court was without jurisdiction to hear a petition for mandamus since
Congress had repealed the statute which had previously allowed the Court
to hear such cases. However, Marshall went on to express his belief that
the Court could act as the final arbiter with respect to the other branches
when their acts interfere with individual rights in violation of the Constitution.
63. The idea of the Supreme Court holding the reins of the Constitution
did not meet with the Jeffersonians' approval. Judicial review by the Court
has therefore been the topic of endless debate. Classic statements viewing
judicial review as undemocratic are found in: Commanger, MAJORITY RULE
AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1943); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Important defenses of judicial intervention are: C.L. Black Jr., THE PEOPLE AND THE
COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960); Rostow, The Democratic
Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
In point of fact, the Court decisions have staked out a wide range of
reviewable cases once thought to be purely political, and when the Court
has refused to act, its refusal is grounded more in its own policy than any
supposed lack of authority. For an example of the Court prying into the
once thought sacred chambers of Congress, see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969).
64. It would be impossible to list every case in which the Supreme
Court has either expressly or impliedly asserted its authority to review the
coordinate branches of federal government. However, a particularly prolific
source of decisions dealing with the subject has been commerce legislation
during the New Deal era. See e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Shechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The
history surrounding these cases not only illustrates the point but provides
enjoyable reading as well.
The executive branch has enjoyed comparative freedom and the President's desk has been a veritable sanctuary. But when public pressure
drives the Court into action, not much escapes its purview. In Nixon v. Administratorof General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), the Court found that
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 was constitutional and that President Nixon could not act contrary to that law. The
effect of this decision was to place much of the President's private materials
into the public domain. By sanctioning an invasion of the Oval Office, the
Court displayed the extent of its power.
65. Today, judicial review surfaces as a real issue primarily in those
cases where the Court is asked to pass upon enactments of state legislatures. The issue becomes critical when the state has acted in reliance on its
strongest power, the police power. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (ban on contraceptives). But even here, the power to review is
assumed by the fact that the Court renders an opinion on the merits. If it
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with syllogistic precision, that if courts can review acts taken by
bodies whose independence is secured by constitutional mandate,66 they have the power to review acts done by agents or appendages of those bodies. The power to review cannot be
destroyed by delegating the authority to act.
However, federal courts cannot agree on the scope of their
power to review grand jury proceedings. 67 This result may be
due to an inexplicable propensity to explore the nature and origin of the grand jury at almost every opportunity. Beyond general agreement that it is not a "tool of the prosecutor,"6 8 courts
69
have thought the grand jury to be either an agent of the court,
executive, 70 legislative branch, 7 1 or an independent body responsible to all branches of government. 72 But although incesupholds the state law, the issue is given at least a cursory treatment. See
also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (exercise of discretion in a zoning ordinance is a legislative not a judicial function). However,
the Court's power borders on being "oppressive" when state legislation concerning desegregation is under attack. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (the Court dictated to the state
legislatures the ground rules for legislation required to effectuate desegregation of public schools).
66. The structure of our Constitution clearly indicates that the framers
intended each of the three branches to enjoy autonomy with respect to their
delegated powers. However, even the separation of those powers has been
at issue before the Court. Cases arise when one branch of government at-

tempts to delegate some of its power to another. Usually successful, an attempt at such delegation will nonetheless command great attention from
the Court when called on to review it. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). The issue becomes intriguing when an act by one
branch attempts to delegate authority outside the coordinate branches to a
territory controlled by the United States. See Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U.S. 315, 321 (1937).
67. Viewing the federal grand jury as an agency of the court, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the grand jury exercises its powers
under the authority and the supervision of the court. United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, rehearing denied, 512 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1975). But a
district court held a grand jury's decision not to bring criminal charges "unreviewable." In re Report and Recommendations of June 5, 1972, Grand
Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to House of Representatives,
370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. United States v. Fisher, 445 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1972) (the grand jury is
not meant to be the private tool of a prosecutor).
69. The federal grand jury is an arm of the district court through which
it derives its power. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (grand jury is an appendage of the court); Bursey v. United States, 446 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972)
(grand jury is an arm of the judiciary).
70. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3rd Cir. 1973) (grand jury
is basically a law enforcement agency and is for all practical purposes an
investigative and prosecutorial arm of the executive branch of government).
71. United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1975) (grand jury is a
creature of statute).
72. In re Dymo Industries, 300 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1969) affid, United
States v. Dymo Industries, 418 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S.
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sant, these metaphysical inquiries bear no relation to the issue
sought to be resolved. Regardless of its nature, and notwithstanding its origin, the grand jury as an institution is a parasite,
not a host, and as such cannot be less prone to review than the
source from which its existence is derived, whatever that source
may be. 73 A federal grand jury indictment is therefore subject to
being held up to the court's constitutional light in the same manner as an act of Congress. But while lip service may be paid to
74
this power, examples of its exercise are rare.
Illinois: The Timid Approach
Prior to 1964, Illinois case law was all but devoid of decisions
even remotely resembling Creque. In People v. Blumenfeld, 75 a
1928 case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the lower
courts have, independent of statute, an inherent right to summon or reconvene a grand jury "whenever the ends of justice
require it to do so."
Blumenfeld was convicted of robbery in the Circuit Court of
McLean County. Upon writ of error, he sought review of the entire record, of which the allegedly defective indictment was only
a small part. The court was not asked to review the substance of
the proceedings before an admittedly qualified jury, but the pro76
priety of a particular group sitting in that capacity.
Similarly, remarks contained in the often cited case People
932 (1969) (grand jury is not wholly identifiable with any one of the three
traditional branches of government).
73. Some courts treat the grand jury as a separate entity unto itself, deriving its power directly from the Constitution. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973). They postulate the grand jury as interposed by the fifth
amendment to afford safeguards against oppressive actions by prosecutors

or the court. Gaither v. United States 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
74. A glaring abuse of the grand jury which resulted in dismissal of an
indictment can be found in Gaitherv. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1969). There, a United States Attorney prepared an indictment that was
signed by the jury foreman but was never submitted to the entire body.
Most cases which address themselves to grand jury conduct do so collaterally, as where a witness before the jury is subsequently tried for perjury.
The issue which typically arises in that case is the propriety of the grand
jury's questions submitted to the witness during his testimony. United
States v. Mancusco, 485 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1973); Bursey v. United States, 466
F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428
F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (the very presence of an unauthorized person
before the grand jury is per se ground for abating an indictment, without
proof of actual prejudice).
75. 330 Ill. 474, 161 N.E. 857 (1928).
76. The defendant's complaint in Blumenfield was that a special grand
jury, called into session earlier, was reconvened without being resworn by
order of court. Defendant contended that this procedure did not comply
with the statute so that the jury which indicted him was "illegal." Id.
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v. Graydon77 go only to defining the duties and functions of a
grand jury. Graydon, like Blumenfeld, questioned not the procedure but the validity of the grand jury that indicted him.
Graydon, coming up on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, was
actually decided on statutory grounds, 78 rendering references to
the power of the grand jury nothing more than dicta.
These two cases fairly represent the extent of litigation in
the state until 1964, when section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure took effect. Its statutory form, set out below, 79 enumerates ten instances when the court may dismiss a criminal
charge on defendant's motion. Unfortunately, this legislative
laundry list is limited to procedural grounds for dismissal, and
does not include any of the catch-all phrases such as "or in any
other case that justice requires."8 0 Consequently, courts have
77. 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
78. In Graydon, the court relied on a statute that permitted a special
grand jury to be summoned by the court. People v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 435,
164 N.E. 832, 835 (1929). Graydon and Blumenfield are not cited as exhaustive of judicial commentary on the grand jury, but representative of remarks frequently made as dicta or in casual reference to history. See also
440, 36 N.E. 99 (1924).
Boone v. People, 148 Ill.
79. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides the following grounds for
granting a defendant's motion to dismiss:
(1) The defendant has not been placed on trial in compliance with
Section 103-5 of this Code (speedy trial provision, also known as the
four term act);
(2) The prosecution of the offense is barred by Sections 3-3
through 3-8 of the "Criminal Code of 1961," approved July 28, 1961, as
heretofore and hereafter amended (double jeopardy and statute of limitations bar);
(3) The defendant has received immunity from prosecution for
the offense charged;
(4) The indictment was returned by a Grand Jury which was improperly selected and which results in substantial injustice to the defendant;
(5) The indictment was returned by a Grand Jury which acted
contrary to Article 112 of this Code and which results in substantial injustice to the defendant (rules governing the calling and impaneling of
a grand jury);
(6) The court in which the charge has been filed does not have
jurisdiction;
(7) The county is an improper place of trial;
(8) The charge does not state an offense;
(9) The indictment is based solely upon the testimony of an incompetent witness;
(10) The defendant is misnamed in the charge and the misnomer
results in substantial injustice to the defendant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-1 (1977) (explanatory parentheticals added).
80. Legislative boiler plate affording a trial court wide latitude in administering the specific provisions of a given rule appear regularly throughout the Code of Criminal Procedure. For example, a court may grant a
motion for continuance on grounds not stated in the statute where "the interests of justice so require." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-4 (d) (1977). The
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been hard pressed to justify anything but the mechanical approach of comparing a motion to the "list" and checking off similarities until they are satisfied it qualifies as one, several, or
"none of the above" reasons to dismiss the charge.
The first real test of an Illinois court's authority to dismiss
an indictment came in People v. Barksdale.81 On December 6,
1963, defendant was indicted for the offense of arson. Ten days
later appointed counsel requested that defendant be examined
by the court behavior clinic. After several continuances on motion by the defendant, in January of 1964, a jury found the accused incompetent to stand trial. He was committed to a state
mental institution, and the pending criminal charge was stricken with leave to reinstate. In December of 1966, three years after his arrest, the arson charge was reinstated and on March 16,
1967 defendant was found competent to stand trial. After various delays, several by defendant's motion, one by the State, and
three by agreement, the cause was finally disposed of on June
14, 1968. On that date, no less than five and one-half years after
defendant's arrest, the state requested a continuance in order to
file an amended list of witnesses. Over State's objection, the
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for want of
82
prosecution.
On appeal by the State, section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure came up for judicial review. After deciding that the
facts of this case did not fit any of the pigeon holes provided in
the statute, the appellate court summarily rejected defendant's
position saying, "[t]he trial court has power to dismiss an indictment prior to trial only for the grounds set forth in section 114-1
court may extend the statutory period in which a defendant must be

brought to trial if it finds the state has exercised "due diligence" to obtain
evidence material to the case but has been unsuccessful. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 103-5 (c) (1977). These phrases which seek to fill in the gaps must be
implicit in all the sections if the code's stated purpose-insuring fair administration of justice-is to be effectuated. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 101-1
(1977).

81. 110 Ill. App. 2d 163, 249 N.E.2d 165 (1969).
82. Dismissal for want of prosecution, and its formal counterpart nolle
prosequi,are terms of art denoting that for one reason or another the action
against the defendant will not proceed. The former is technically applicable
only in civil cases where the plaintiff has failed to prosecute his action with
due diligence. 27 C.J.S. Dismissal & Nonsuit § 65 (1) (1955). The latter is a
formal entry upon the record at a criminal trial that the state is not willing
to proceed against the defendant. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 456 (1955).
However, courts ignore the technical distinction and dismiss criminal
charges for failure of the state to prosecute with due diligence. People v.
Nelson, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 628, 310 N.E.2d 174 (1974) (failure of state's witness to
appear was grounds for dismissal even though prosecution sought a continuance and wished to proceed); People v. Rinks 80 Ill. App. 2d 152, 224 N.E.2d
29 (1967) (magistrate dismissed criminal charges "for want of prosecution").
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of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Four years later the issue in Barksdale was presented again
in People v. Guido84 and People v. Hoover.85 In each case, defendant's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution was granted
at the trial level. Reversing the decisions below, the appellate
court in each instance recited almost verbatim the rhetoric set
out in Barksdale. After Hoover, speculation in the market rose
sharply amid rumors that appellate court clerks in Illinois would
soon be clamoring for rubber stamps bearing the language of
Barksdale. Clearly, the trial court's authority with respect to indictments was strictly limited to the four corners of the statute.
But the limitation was eased slightly by the Illinois
Supreme Court. In People v. Lawson,86 the court recognized an
inherent power to dismiss indictments, informations, or complaints, notwithstanding section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, where "due process has clearly been denied." After
proclaiming an awareness of the appellate cases holding that
the trial court may not dismiss an indictment for any reason
other than those given in section 114-1 of the Code, Mr. Justice
Clark said:
[W]e believe that on the basis of the reasoning of our past decisions and that of the appellate courts and on the basis of the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, we must conclude that
a trial court does have an inherent authority to dismiss an indictment in a criminal case where there has been a clear denial of due
process even though that is not a ground. stated in section 114-1.87
Lawson seems to have put the trial courts back on the track
toward securing due process safeguards for an accused. Its
holding is plain, unambiguous, and sufficiently broad to cover
many situations which may result in a clear denial of due process. The decision does not purport to be limited to procedural or
technical denials of due process, and appears equally applicable
where a defendant has simply been deprived of fundamental
fairness at any stage in the pretrial process, including indictment by a grand jury.
But remember, Graydon and Blumenfeld addressed themselves only to whether a trial court could convene a grand jury
relying solely on its inherent authority. Further, Lawson may
be read as speaking only to the power to dismiss a charge for
procedural delays assuming it had first emanated from a cogent
body. These cases are easily distinguishable from Creque,
83. 110 Ill. App. 2d 163, 165, 249 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1969).

84. 11 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 297 N.E.2d 18 (1973).
85. 12 Ill. App. 3d 25, 297 N.E.2d 400 (1973).
86. 67 Ill. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977).
87. Id. at 455, 367 N.E.2d 1246 (emphasis added).
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where the issues of pretrial due process and judicial review are
focused in the void between Blumenfeld and Graydon, squarely
on the shoulders of the grand jury. Creque lies beyond
Blumenfeld in that it admits the jury's legitimacy, but stops
short of Lawson in that it questions not the subsequent use of
an indictment, but the propriety of the means employed to secure it. Creque, therefore, tests the range of the power recognized in Lawson to determine if that power extends into the
grand jury room itself.
PRETRIAL DUE PROCESS-FORMULATING A STANDARD

The United States Constitution,8 8 along with a monumental
body of case law highlighted in more recent years by Miranda v.
Arizona 89 and Mapp v. Ohio,90 espouse the principles of procedural due process. 9 1 Though this concept fluctuates in scope, its
underlying premise remains firmly intact. From the moment
the criminal process begins the prosecution must proceed in a
manner which reflects the accepted maxims applicable to each
phase of that process. 92 This reasoning is admittedly circular
and provides little in the way of definition. It does, however, elucidate the fact that due process is relative, not only to changing
values in substantive law, but to the particular situations being
93
evaluated as well.
88. Two of the most fruitful sources of Constitutional litigation are the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
89. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda, one of the most significant decisions
toward protecting procedural due process for accused persons, dictated that
prior to any questioning, certain rights must be made known to the accused.
The sanction imposed for failure to comply was that any evidence or confession obtained through questioning could not be used against the individual
at trial.
90. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Though the incorporation controversy-whether
the fourteenth amendment binds the states to follow the first ten Amendments-has never been fully resolved, Mapp took a step toward an affirmative answer. The Court held that fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the fourteenth, and any evidence illegally seized will be excluded from trial in state
court.
91. A list of definitions encompassing all those things which are or could
be considered within the notion of due process would approach infinite
length. The concept's essential elements include notice and an opportunity
to be heard. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn.
29, 295 N.W. 75 (1940); Di Maio v. Reid, 132 N.J.L. 17, 37 A.2d 829 (1944). But
in its broadest sense, the term means simply that law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that some real and substantial relationship exist between the end sought and the means employed to achieve that
end. Nebbia v. People of the State of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); North
American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 133 F.2d 148 (2nd
Cir. 1943).
92. See note 11 supra.
93. Id. All of the cases dealing with the fifth and fourteenth amend-
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Historically, pretrial activity was not regarded as a critical
stage of a criminal prosecution since jeopardy did not attach until trial. 94 The purpose of pretrial proceedings was thought to be
primarily ministerial. In fact, the atmosphere surrounding these
affairs more closely resembles the trading floor of the New York
Stock Exchange than a hall of justice. This is not to suggest that
a conscious effort exists to subvert our judicial system, but
merely points out that the type of activity outlined in Creque
has become a widely accepted reality. Therefore, denying an accused otherwise fundamental rights during grand jury proceedings has become part of the substantive law. No one can
seriously challenge the grand jury indictment on due process
grounds so long as its classification as a "noncritical" stage in
the criminal process remains viable. 95 By necessary implication, and to preserve the logic of the model, courts have likewise
classified the preliminary hearing a "noncritical" component in
96
felony prosecutions.
ments seem to agree that due process of law can only be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Conduct in one situation which violates fundamental
principles of justice may be excused by the facts of another. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Boykins v. Fairfield, 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974);
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated,
414 U.S. 809 (1973); Daby v. American Col. of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.
1972); Howard v. United States, 372 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 815 (1967).
94. No jeopardy attaches at a preliminary hearing. United States v. Battisti, 486 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Johnson v. United States, 169 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re
Russell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 524 P.2d 1295 (1974). Jeopardy attaches at trial
when the taking of testimony begins. State v. Blackwell, 198 P.2d 280 (Nev.
1948), rehearingdenied, 200 P.2d 698, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 939 (1949); State
v. Doyle, 11 Ohio App. 2d 97, 228 N.E.2d 863 (1967). However the exact time
when jeopardy attaches is in dispute. State v. Cunningham, 535 P.2d 186
(Mont. 1975) (jeopardy attaches when first witness is sworn); Ochoa v.
State, 492 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1973) (jeopardy attaches on entering of a plea).
95. State v. Stalling, 25 Conn. Sup. 386, 224 A.2d 718 (1966). See also
Comm. v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 333 N.E.2d 400 (1975). The grand jury's classification as a noncritical stage in prosecutions, is an inference more than a
statement, drawn from the fact that an accused has never possessed the
right to counsel during grand jury proceedings. In re Lung, 1 Conn. 428
(1815). See note 22 supra.
96. Since a preliminary hearing is not a trial, all the procedures for trial
need not be employed, but the hearing must nonetheless comport with fundamental notions of fairness. Berger v. Jennings, 110 Ariz. 441, 520 P.2d 313
(1974); People v. Gaines, 53 Mich. App. 443, 220 N.W.2d 76 (1974); State v.
Lenahan, 12 Ariz. App. 446, 471 P.2d 748 (1970); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462
P.2d 729 (1969). Other courts state the proposition that a preliminary hearing is noncritical. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Johns v. Pinto, 449
F.2d 613 (3rd Cir. 1971); Walker v. Maroney, 313 F. Supp. 237, aff'd 444 F.2d 47
(3rd Cir. 1971); Donlavey v. Smith, 426 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1970); Walker v.
Wainright, 409 F.2d 1311, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 894 (1969); Budd v. Rundle,
267 F. Supp. 49, a~fd, 398 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1968).
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However, it is quite frankly inconceivable that a defendant
accused of a felony would be in accord with the assertion that
the pretrial stage of his prosecution was "noncritical"-particularly when the initial charge is by arrest and the
individual is unable to post bond. In that case, a determination
of probable cause will result in his immediate incarceration. In
Coleman v. Alabama,9 7 the United States Supreme Court took
cognizance of these facts when it vacated the convictions of Alabama indigent defendants who had been shuffled through that
state's pretrial process. The Court, in holding that an accused is
entitled to the aid of counsel at a preliminary hearing, concluded
that this proceeding was a critical stage of the Alabama criminal
justice system. 98
Within three months the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
its earlier position by adopting the holding of Coleman. The
court, in People v. Adams, 99 recognizing identity of purpose between Illinois' preliminary hearing and the process at work in
Alabama, felt compelled to follow the teaching of Coleman. But
while this decision kept Illinois in step with the United States
Supreme Court, it unwittingly struck a local note of discord.
After Adams, Illinois found itself in the curious position of operating two pretrial charades, each with its own set of rules. The
grand jury retained its autonomy while the preliminary hearing
became bound to a higher standard of procedural due process.
Assuming that the primary function of both the grand jury indictment and the preliminary hearing is to determine probable
cause, what rule of substantive law justifies the distinction? Is
there not a denial of due process being built into the grand jury
indictment by definition, not to mention a flagrant violation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause? 0 0
The distinction has been dealt with by several states that
have abandoned reliance on the grand jury indictment as the
sole means of initiating a felony prosecution. l0 1 Others have
97.
98.
99.
100.

399 U.S. 1 (1970).
Id. at 9-10.
46 Ill. 2d 198, 263 N.E.2d 488 (1970).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-

vides in relevant part: "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person Within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
This section has been taken to mean that any variation in the application of
a law must bear a rational relationship to the achievement of a legitimate

goal. Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Perry
v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss.
1969). See also Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124
Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (Wright, C.J., concurring).

101. In the following states felony prosecutions can be initiated either by
indictment or the less formal information; Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo.,
Conn., Fla., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., La., Md., Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.M., N.Y.,
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"evened the score" by extending certain rights to an accused
when appearing before a grand jury. 10 2 But Illinois continues to
rationalize rather than reason. One commentator offered as justification that the grand jury indictment is accusatory while the
preliminary hearing is merely custodial. Therefore, since the
two bodies perform different functions, any procedural inconsistencies are irrelevant to the rights of an accused. 10 3 Though this
rationale may serve as a haven for courts determined to preserve the autonomy of the grand jury, upon closer examination
the chasmic distinction suggested quickly evaporates.
In order for a judge, sitting at a preliminary hearing, to enter
an order binding the accused over to the grand jury he must find
probable cause to hold the defendant. Similarly, before the
grand jury can indict an individual bound over to them, they
must also find probable cause, this time to formally charge the
accused. But since the power to act in each case is derived from
a similar finding, all things being otherwise equal, inconsistent
results are possible only when different standards of probable
cause are applied. It necessarily follows that two standards
aimed at gauging the same thing must be related as a matter of
degree. However, to sanction two standards for determining
probable cause runs the risk of placing wholesale police powers
in the hands of the prosecutor. If the lower standard becomes
synonymous with capricious hit-or-miss accusations, we have
taken a substantial step backward to the tactics of the star
10 4

chamber.

N.D., Okla., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., and Wyoming. Even Illinois has
provided for prosecution by information, but this has had no real impact on
the operation of the criminal justice system. The Illinois statute requires
that when the prosecution is by information, a preliminary hearing be held
to determine probable cause. Sounds good so far, but remember that a
judge's finding of no probable cause is not binding on the grand jury. Even
if a defendant is released on the information, the prosecutor can still seek
an indictment for the same offense . . . Catch-22? ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 111-2 (1977). This feature seems to distinguish Illinois from other jurisdictions where a not so cavalier attitude is exhibited toward proceedings following dismissal by a judge sitting at a preliminary hearing. Skinner v.
Superior Court in and for the County of Prima, 106 Ariz. 287, 475 P.2d 271
(1970) (subsequent indictment allowed after offering additional evidence);
Wilson v. Garrett, 104 Ariz. 57, 448 P.2d 857 (1969) (prosecution cannot
"shuttle" a defendant from one magistrate to another simply because he is
unhappy with the result); Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116
(1977) (procedures are not so formal at a preliminary hearing to prohibit reopening them to admit additional evidence); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616
(OkI. Cir. 1971) (state must have additional evidence before proceeding

against the accused on the same charge).
102. See note 114 infra.
103. Robinson, supra note 12, at 945.
104. During the reign of Henry VIII, the star chamber became infamous
for severely punishing violators of the king's arbitrary proclamations. It de-
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Probable cause must remain a constant in the equation. It
would be a sad commentary on the state of our judicial system if
the substance in a concept could be shaped to fit the form of its
administration. Further, any distinction between a judicial determination of probable cause and indictment by the grand jury
must be clerical only. A functional difference would interfere
with an accused's right to a speedy trial10 5 and relegate the preliminary hearing to a secondary role in derogation of the Illinois
Constitution. 0 6
Finally, maintaining these two pretrial devices on discoordinate procedural planes defies all but the most narrow logic. It
is reasonable to conclude that a judge, bound by the rules of evidence and able to hear cross examination, will be less likely to
find probable cause from a given set of evidence than an unrestricted grand jury, even if the same standard of probable
cause is applied. But which procedure more closely resembles
the inevitable atmosphere of trial? There seems to be no legitimate reason for allowing a prosecutor, absent a showing of additional evidence,1 0 7 to secure an indictment after suffering an
adverse result at a preliminary hearing. A new breed of justice
is being served by forcing an accused to prepare for a trial when
it has been made obvious that the state cannot make out a prima
facie case against him.10 8 To the extent that this activity results
in confinement, an accused is most certainly deprived of his liberty without due process of law. 10 9
generated, grew odious to the nation, and was finally abolished. 4 Steph.
Comm. 310; BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1577 (4th ed. 1968).
105. It is generally recognized that a defendant has a right to a speedy
trial. Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). Prince v. State, 507 F.2d 693 (5th
Cir. 1976); McIntyre v. Pearson, 435 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 947 (1970). In Illinois, statute provides that a defendant must be
brought to trial within 120 days of his being taken into custody. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (1977).
106. The preliminary hearing is presumably on a par with the grand jury
indictment. ILL. CONST. art. I § 7 cl. 2.
107. Even the delegates to the 1970 convention agreed that when the
prosecutor failed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing, he
was free to seek an indictment based on new or additional evidence. See 3
PROCEEDINGS

supra note 40, at 1455.

108. The burden of proof in a criminal case is "beyond a reasonable
doubt." 22A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 566 (1955). If the state cannot establish
probable cause, or a reasonable belief in defendant's guilt at the pretrial
stage, it appears incandescent that they will not be able to meet their burden at trial. Id.
109. Once a judicial determination of no probable cause is entered upon
the record, it would appear that any pretrial confinement resulting from a
subsequent indictment has no foundation in law notwithstanding the indictment. That this assertion has not been accepted by Illinois courts does
not render its logic any less accurate. To the extent it is still recognized,
Quo Warranto should lie against the grand jury who returns an indictment
in such a case. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1417 (4th ed. 1968).
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It would be meaningless to propose specific guidelines of
conduct for a procedural due process standard applicable to pretrial proceedings. Yet two simple suggestions seem to resolve
the confusion and limit debate. First, the proceedings of both
the grand jury and the preliminary hearing must be made complete. They must each be capable of initiating prosecutions
upon a finding of probable cause, and absent a change in circumstance sufficient to warrant reconsideration, a finding by one
must be binding on the other. Second, whatever constitutional
safeguards are to be afforded an accused, they must be the same
or substantially similar in each forum. Only by observing these
two criteria can any semblance of fairness be attributed to the
pretrial process.
CREQUE IN THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

The circuit court judge in Creque was of the opinion that the
cumulative effect of the proceedings before the grand jury had
deprived the defendant of due process, and thus dismissed the
indictment. 110 However, the Illinois Supreme Court took an approach to the case which effectively dissipated the strength of
defendant's argument.'
By breaking down the overriding issue of due process into four component parts, the court handily
disposed of the case and averted a major policy decision. In its
fastidious disposal of each fabricated straw issue, the court was
able to point to an ample supply of statutory and case law to
support its decision. However, in doing so, the Illinois Supreme
Court completely ignored a trend developing in this country to
protect the integrity of the judicial process by more closely supervising the performance of the grand jury.
The first issue raised by the Illinois Supreme Court was the
2
propriety of using hearsay evidence to procure an indictment."
Unquestionably, an unbroken line of authority in Illinois sanctions this practice." 3 However, instead of dutifully adhering to
the principles of stare decisis, the court should have seized the
opportunity to bring Illinois in line with the ever-increasing
110. People v. Creque, No. 77-1973, slip op. at 6 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sep. 19, 1977).
111. People v. Creque, 72 Ill. 2d 515, 382 N.E.2d 793 (1978). In the majority

opinion, Justice Underwood saw the case as presenting four separate issues, none of which included the issue of due process as presented by
Judge Strayhorn in his memorandum opinion.
112. 72 Mll. 2d at 521, 382 N.E.2d at 795 (1978).
113. People v. Hopkins, 53 Ill. 2d 452, 292 N.E.2d 418 (1973); People v.
Jones, 19 IMI. 2d 37, 166 N.E.2d 1 (1960); People v. Bissonnette, 20 Ill. App. 3d
970 313 N.E.2d 646 (1974). Moreover, it has also been held that it is proper
for the state to present evidence to the grand jury that has been suppressed
at the preliminary hearing. People v. Taylor, 124 Ill. App. 2d 168, 260 N.E.2d
347 (1970). But see People v. Marotta, 3 Ill. App. 3d 280, 278 N.E.2d 256 (1972).
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number of jurisdictions which have sharply limited this proce-

dure.ll

4

A fair representative of these jurisdictions is Alaska. Seven
years ago in State v. Burkholder,115 the Alaska Supreme Court
recognized that the hearsay evidence presented to the grand
jury totally lacked probative value. Consequently, they dis6
missed an indictment predicated solely on hearsay testimony."
Shortly thereafter the Alaska Supreme Court adopted Rule 6(r)
of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure." 7 In essence this
rule provides that hearsay evidence shall not be presented to a
1 18
grand jury absent compelling justification for its introduction.
Thus, if direct witnesses are available, they are required to testify before the grand jury. Certainly this cannot be viewed as
unreasonable, and is no more burdensome on the criminal process than calling the investigating officer before the grand jury to
summarize the evidence.
In order to lend credence to the continuation of this practice, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Costello v. United
States.119 Indeed, in Costello, the United States Supreme Court
held that an indictment may be based solely on hearsay evidence. 120 Moreover, this principle has been affirmed on subsequent occasions. 12 1 However, at least one circuit court has
eroded this principle somewhat by subjecting it to qualifica114. For a complete list of the jurisdictions which do not permit an indictment to be predicated solely on hearsay evidence see Annot., 37 ALR 3d 612

(1971).
115. 491 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1971).
116. Id. at 758.
117. Alaska R. Crim. P. 6 (r) provides:
Evidence which would be legally admissible at trial shall be admissible
before the grand jury. In appropriate cases, however, witnesses may be
presented to summarize admissible evidence if the admissible evidence
will be available at trial. Hearsay evidence shall not be presented to the
grand jury absent compelling justification for its introduction. If hearsay evidence is presented to the grand jury, the reasons for its use shall
be stated on the record.
For applications of this rule see State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976);
Webb v. State, 527 P.2d 35 (Alaska 1974); State v. George, 511 P.2d 1293
(Alaska 1973); Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972).
118. In State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 465 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska
Supreme Court held that mere expense of transportation for eight witnesses who were out of state when the grand jury met did not make it necessary for a police officer to testify before the grand jury on their behalf.
The court went on to say that a reliable determination of probable cause
can best be guaranteed when witnesses against an accused appear in person.
119. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
120. Id. at 363.
121. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701
(1972).
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tions. In United States v. Leibowitz,122 the Second Circuit stated
that indictments based on hearsay evidence will not be dismissed "unless it appears that dismissal is required to protect
the integrity of the judicial process." 123 The court went on to say
that dismissal should be considered if there is a high probability
that with eyewitnesses rather than hearsay testimony the grand
jury would not have indicted. 124 Thus, it appears that, hypothetically speaking, if the Second Circuit standard had been applied
12 5
in Creque the indictment would have been dismissed.
The second issue considered by the Illinois Supreme Court
was whether the prosecutor's failure to disclose to the grand
jury the hearsay nature of the evidence rendered the indictment
invalid. 126 The court cited federal cases which acknowledged
the prosecutor's failure as a ground for dismissal but quickly
distinguished them as standing for the proposition that an indictment may be dismissed only when a grand jury has been
misled into thinking that it is hearing direct evidence when it is
not. 127 Here again the Illinois Supreme Court demonstrated its
propensity to rationalize rather than reason. The majority opinion curiously avoided discussion of federal cases wherein a misleading of the grand jury was not required in order to dismiss an
indictment. In United States v. Gallo,128 it was held that the
prosecutor is under an affirmative duty to enlighten the grand
jury as to the nature of the evidence they are receiving. 129 Prior
to Gallo, criticism had been leveled at prosecutors who
presented hearsay evidence without making it clear to the jurors
122. 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969).
123. Id. at 42. See also United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975).
124. 420 F.2d at 42.
125. Furthermore other federal decisions espouse principles which, if applied, would warrant dismissal of the indictment in Creque. See United
States v. Esteppa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Andrews, 381
F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 960 (1968); United States v.
Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp.
39 (D.R.I. 1969).
126. 72 Ill. 2d at 523, 382 N.E.2d at 796 (1978).
127. Id. The court cites United States v. Basturo, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1974) and United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972), and contends
that the validity of these two cases has been "questioned" by United States
v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001, n. 29 (2d Cir. 1977). However, Justice Un-

derwood fails to point out that in Marchand no deception of the grand jury
was involved. Furthermore, the court in Marchland also concluded that the
grand jury would have indicted even if the direct witness would have been
called. Id.
128. 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975).
129. Id. at 315. See also United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968).
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that they are receiving "shoddy merchandise."1 30 The common
theme which runs throughout these decisions is, if direct evidence is readily available, the prosecutor should produce it for
the grand jury to evaluate. Indeed, if the historic function of the
grand jury is to be preserved-that of a buffer between the overzealous prosecutor and the accused-such a requirement is indispensable.
The third issue raised by the Court in Creque-a corollary to
the above-was whether a prosecutor must advise the grand
jury of its power to secure the presence of direct witnesses by
subpoena. 131 So obvious was the resolution of this issue to the
Illinois Supreme Court that they disposed of it in one paragraph.
The Court simply stated that no statutory duty is imposed on an
Illinois prosecutor to do SO. 13 2 Moreover, a prosecutor's task is
complete when, pursuant to ch. 38, par. 112-4(b), 1 33 he advises
the grand jurors of their power to subpoena anyone against
whom the state might seek an indictment. The key words of
this statute are "against whom the state might seek an indictment." This statute merely apprises the grand jury of their
power to subpoena a potential defendant. It defies reason to believe that it also sufficiently apprises the grand jury of their
power to subpoena witnesses to the event. Grand juries in Illinois do in fact possess this power, 134 but from where they learn
of it is anyone's guess. Thus it seems that when a prosecutor
fulfills his statutory duty in Illinois, he, in effect, misleads the
135
grand jury.
The final issue dealt with by the Court in Creque was defendant's contention that a prosecutor must advise a grand jury
130. United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966).
131. 72 Ill.
2d at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 797 (1978).

132. Id.
133. The first paragraph of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4 (b) (1977) provides:
The Grand Jury has the right to subpoena and question any person
against whom the State's Attorney is seeking a Bill of Indictment. Prior
to the commencement of its duties and, again, before the consideration
of each matter or charge before the Grand Jury, the State's Attorney
shall inform the Grand Jury of this right.
134. In People v. Bissonnette, 20 Ill. App. 3d 970, 313 N.E.2d 646 (1974), the
Second District held that a grand jury has the power to require the presence of witnesses if it feels it needs additional or more complete informa-

tion. However, it is preposterous to believe that the mere existence of case
law sufficiently apprises the grand jury of this power.

135. One can only speculate as to why all the powers of the grand jury
are not codified, but it would not be unreasonable to suspect that the Illinois legislature is desirous of leaving prosecutorial powers undiluted. Fair
play and common sense call for the Illinois Supreme Court to rectify this
unhealthy situation.
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when a judge at a preliminary hearing finds no probable
cause. 136 Disposal of this issue was again accomplished by a
cursory reference to prior Illinois authority to the effect that no
such duty exists. 137 Thus, the justices clearly conveyed the
message that they had no desire to delve into the correctness of
their prior decisions. The California Supreme Court offers an
interesting study in contrast.
In 1975, the California Supreme Court was confronted with a
case remarkably similar to Creque. In Johnson v. Superior
Court,1 38 a magistrate entered a finding of no probable cause after a preliminary hearing in which direct evidence had been adduced. Undaunted, the district attorney proceeded to present
hearsay evidence to the grand jury which obediently returned
an indictment. The defendant challenged the indictment on the
ground that the district attorney had failed to apprise the grand
jurors of the magistrate's finding of no probable cause. The California Supreme Court sustained the defendant's position basing
its decision on a state statute. 139 They concluded that the district attorney must advise the grand jury as to the nature and
existence of any exculpatory evidence known to him. 140 A close
examination of the statute relied upon by the California court
reveals, however, that its only clear mandate requires the production of state's evidence. Analogously, ch. 38, sec. 112-4(a)' 4 '
of the Illinois revised statutes, also mandates the grand jury to
hear "all evidence presented by the State's Attorney." Consequently, in Johnson a strained interpretation of the California
statute was necessary in order to reach the desired result. Furthermore, two justices who concurred in the result were also
136. 72 Ill.
2d at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 797 (1978).
137. A close reading of the Supreme Court opinion in Creque indicates
that the majority never dealt with this issue. Justice Underwood framed it

but then proceeded to discuss whether a finding of no probable cause at a
preliminary hearing is binding on the grand jury. Id. at 525, 382 N.E.2d at
797.
138. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975). For a thorough
analysis of this case see generally Haigh, The Future of the Grand Jury Indictment in California,3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 365 (1976).
139. Cal. Penal Code § 939.7 (West 1970) provides:
The grand jury is not required to hear evidence for the defendant,
but it shall weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and when it has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the
charge, it shall order the evidence to be produced, and for that purpose
may require the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses.
Clearly, this statute does not expressly obligate the district attorney to advise the grand jury of any exculpatory evidence known to him. Yet the California Court, reluctant to reach the constitutional issues raised by the case,
was moved by a sense of fairness to read such an obligation into the statute.
140. 15 Cal. 3d at 250, 539 P.2d at 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4 (a) provides: 'The Grand Jury shall
hear all evidence presented by the State's Attorney."
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quite willing to reach the constitutional issues raised by the
case. 142 These justices were prepared to hold that the indicting
function of the grand jury, as exercised in California, violates
both equal protection and due process standards.
As the above discussion demonstrates, standing alone, any
one of the actions taken by the prosecutor in Creque may have
resulted in dismissal of the indictment in a number of United
States jurisdictions. Yet even the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's actions was insufficient to persuade the Illinois Supreme
Court that the defendant's due process rights had been violated.
The reluctance of the supreme court to analyze grand jury proceedings in light of modern due process requirements reflects
an unwillingness to withdraw constitutional support for a venerable institution. However, Creque may even represent a retreat
from a prior position put forth by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Conspicuous by its absence in the Creque opinion was any
reference to People v. Sears.143 In Sears, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that Illinois courts have a supervisory duty to see
The
that the grand jury and its processes are not abused. 1'
court went on to say that supervision must be exercised when a
failure to do so would effect a deprivation of due process or result in a miscarriage of justice. 145 It is difficult to believe that the
processes of the grand jury were not abused in Creque. Moreover, the court came prayerfully close to admitting as much. In
142. Justice Torbiner recognized that the Johnson case raised serious
constitutional questions, but chose to reserve their determination for a case
wherein the issues were well-delineated. 15 Cal. 3d at 270, 539 P.2d at 807,
124 Cal. Rptr. at 47. However, Chief Justice Wright and Justice Mosk contrasted the different procedures involved when a prosecution is initiated by
information and preliminary hearing as opposed to grand jury indictment.
They felt that in light of the lower level of procedural safeguards granted an
accused in grand jury proceedings, a prosecution by indictment fails to
meet due process standards. 15 Cal. 3d at 256-57, 539 P.2d at 797, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 37. If the majority had reached this conclusion, a number of prior
California cases would have been implicitly overruled. E.g., People v.
Rojas, 2 Cal. App. 3d 767, 82 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1969); People v. Flores, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 61, 81 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1969).
143. 49 Ill. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971).
144. Id. at 28, 273 N.E.2d at 392. Indeed, there is Illinois authority which
states that a trial judge is responsible for the justice of the judgment that he
enters. Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. 2d 103, 106, 210 N.E.2d
191, 194 (1965). If Illinois courts have no power or control over the grand
jury, then this responsibility, at least in criminal trials, would be impossible
to fulfill.
145. 49 Ill. 2d at 31, 273 N.E.2d at 394. The Court reached this conclusion
even though they recognized the importance of preserving the historic independence of the grand jury. Moreover, this view has been expressed in
other jurisdictions as well. See People v. laniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d
439 (1968) (particular responsibility imposed upon the judiciary to prevent
unfairness in grand jury proceedings). See also In re National Window
Glass Worker, 287 F. Supp. 219, 224 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
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response to defendant's assertion of abuse, Justice Underwood
restated the age-old adage that the most important protection
for the accused in our system of law is a fair trial itself.146 While
this statement ignores reality and is understandably viewed
with contempt by many courts and commentators, 147 it also
casts serious doubt on the vitality of the court's holding in
Sears. Consequently, the decision in Creque confuses rather
that clarifies Illinois law.
CONCLUSION

148

In Watts v. Indiana, Mr. Justice Frankfurter admonished
the judiciary that: "there comes a point where a court should not
be ignorant as judges of things they know as men." In regard to
the determination of probable cause in Illinois, that point has
long since been reached. People v. Creque presented the
supreme court with the opportunity to remedy some of the
flagrant abuses which infest grand jury proceedings in Illinois.
However, Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, was the only
member of the court willing to seize this opportunity. 149 Moreover, judicial action was made all the more urgent by the fact
that the legislature has declined to exercise its constitutional
authority for 108 years. 5 0 In opting to ignore a situation which
cries out for reform, the court once again demonstrated its
seemingly inexhaustible desire to preserve an awkward, illogical approach to determining probable cause that makes a mockery of modern concepts of due process. Allowing the indictment
process to escape unscathed from the decision in Creque, certified the grand jury as an immortal, indestructable barrier to the
evolution of the Illinois criminal justice system.
David F. Platek
Howard D. Lieberman

146. 72 Ill. 2d at 527, 382 N.E.2d at 798.
147. A wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; it often works a grievous irreparable injury to the person indicted. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1947). People v. Creque, 72 Ill. 2d 515, 382 N.E.2d 793 (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). See also Frank, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942); Hall, Objectives
of Criminal ProceduralRevision, 51 YALE L. J. 723, 741 (1942); People v.
Sears, 49 Ill. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971). See text accompanying note 26
supra.
148. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).

149. 72 Ill. 2d at 528, 382 N.E.2d at 789. Justice Clark is of the opinion that
Illinois courts do possess the power to dismiss an indictment when there is
prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury.
150. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.

